

**From the Maidan to the Military:
Mobilizing Civilians for Counter-Insurgency in Eastern Ukraine**

Vera Mironova (Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School)

Sam Whitt (High Point University)

Abstract

When governments seek to mobilize civilians for military combat, who answers the call? In the aftermath of the 2014 Euromaidan protests, the Ukrainian government initiated a widespread campaign to mobilize young men for military service to counter separatist movements in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine amid escalating tensions with Russia. In July 2014, we survey young men who were volunteering to join the Ukrainian military's counter-insurgency efforts and compare them to other young men who live in the same community but had not volunteered. We find strong linkages between prior Euromaidan activism and military mobilization. A heightened sense of self-efficacy, risk tolerance, and support for violence helps explain the transition to increasingly higher cost, higher risk forms of collective action.

Introduction

While a number of scholars have examined motivations for joining rebel group insurgencies (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wood 2003; Kalyvas 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Arjona and Kalyvas 2011), more attention is now being paid to government efforts to recruit civilians into military combat to counter such insurgencies (Jentzsch et. al. 2015; Staniland 2015; Forney 2015; Carey et. al. 2015). One possibility is that the logic of recruitment is the same. Prospective insurgents and counter-insurgents are both motivated by a combination of rational choice-based selective incentives and/or psychologically-driven motives (Petersen 2002, Weinstein 2006). In this study, we examine who responds to government-led mobilization efforts to fight insurgency. Drawing on Weinstein's (2006) distinction between *activist* vs. *opportunistic* motives for fighting, we explore the strength of activist-driven mobilization in the case of recent conflict in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine. Given the intense Euromaidan protests that preceded the current conflict, we ask whether Maidan-related activism naturally spills over into counter-insurgency recruitment. We conduct surveys of young men who report to a government army recruitment station for deployment to the front against ethnic Russian separatists in the Donbas region. We test our hypothesis about political activism and military mobilization by comparing recruits to young men in the same community who did

not enlist. We find that recruits display elevated political activism and activist-driven grievances that are not shared by their non-combatant counterparts. Our research advances the literature by evaluating how prior political activism finds expression in people's willingness to engage in combat. Overall, we find that a strong sense of self-efficacy, risk tolerance, and a willingness to engage in violent collective action helps explain the shift from political activism to military combat. Our results also underscore how governments and entrepreneurial elites might rely on similar tactics as their insurgent counterparts to mobilize civilians for violence.

Literature

What drives civilians to join the military in times of war and crisis? Our research examines why people join the military to counter a regional domestic insurgency. In the counter-insurgency literature, research tends to focus on the strategies for battling insurgencies (Fielding and Shortland 2010; Toft and Zhukov 2012) and how different strategies might affect insurgent support (Lyll 2009; Lyll et. al. 2013). However, less is known about how governments might recruit from civilian populations to fight insurgencies and what induces civilians to join counter-insurgency efforts. Research generally suggests that recruitment for counter-insurgency is challenging, especially when attachments to national

governments are weak (Giustozzi 2007), regional, sectarian, or ethnic parochial divisions are strong (Sambanis et. al. 2012), or when counter-insurgency efforts are led by external state actors (Shafer 2014). The success of counter-insurgency efforts may also depend on whether insurgents themselves receive support from external state backers (Salehyan et. al. 2011; Maoz and San-Akca 2012).

In the broader literature on military recruitment and enlistment, there is considerable variation in government strategies and capacities for mobilizing civilians (Strachan and Chris Bellamy 2004). For centuries, conscription has been the dominant method for raising and maintaining standing armies, but the 20th century saw the rise of volunteer, professional armies (Kreidberg and Henry 1955; Hansen and Weisbrod 1967; Moskos 1977; Warner and Asch 2001). In terms of recruitment, economists almost universally agree on the efficiency of volunteerism over conscription (Lee and McKenzie 1992, though see Korb and Duggan 2007). However, even countries with volunteer militaries will often resort to conscription during wartime to increase military mobilization (Ross 1994).

Regime type also matters to recruitment strategies. Democracies are more likely to rely on volunteer armies while authoritarian regimes often revert to conscription, and democracies also invest more heavily in the training, safety, and well-being of their soldiers, are more risk averse about engaging in war, but are more likely to commit to winning the wars they fight (Reiter and Stam 2002; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011). Choi and James (2003) and Pickering

(2010) find that states with conscription-based militaries are also more likely to engage in conflict, especially against rebel and insurgency groups, than those with volunteer professional armies. Hence, the logic of military recruitment may depend on whether the nation is at war or peace, whether the regimes in question are democratic or authoritarian, whether recruitment relies on volunteerism or conscription, and the scope and nature of the threat in question (internal insurgent groups, external state actors, transnational terrorist organizations, etc.).

In both volunteer and conscript-based militaries, the military recruitment literature often points to structural inequalities, labor market opportunity costs, and selective incentives to explain both who enters into military service and into combat roles specifically (Warner et. al. 2003; Asch et. al. 2010). However, the literature also shows that emotions and symbolic psychological beliefs (patriotism, nationalism, honor, pride, group bonding) may be as important as instrumental and selective material benefits to draw people into the military and retain them (Burk 1984; Shils, Gorman and Thomas 1991; Barber 1998; Wong 2003; Lievens 2007; Griffith 2008).

Military recruits are also not generally representative of the broader population of those eligible for service. In all-volunteer armies, like the United States, the burdens of service are not shared evenly (Kleykamp 2006; Elder et al. 2010). In contrasting enlisted military to civilians, Bachman et. al. (2000) note substantial disparities in terms of class, race, ethnicity, and education. Comparing

servicemen in combat roles to those in non-combat support roles, Maclean and Parsons (2010) find further disparity in terms of class, race, and education on who is selected into combat. Even with the activation of the draft lottery during the Vietnam War, Allen et. al. (1994) concluded that “the lower class sacrificed considerably more lives” when examining fatalities in the war. Overall, there is inherent selection bias in terms of who joins and who fights, even under conscription-based regimes with ostensibly randomized recruitment methods.

Our research explores another source of potential selection bias based on prior political activism and activist-driven grievances. Less is known about the role of political activism in military recruitment during wartime, as most recent empirical studies of activist-driven grievances have been highly insurgency-focused. From the insurgency literature, Weinstein (2006) draws important distinctions between *activist* versus *opportunistic* motives for violence, where activists tend to mobilize on the basis of expressly political grievances, while opportunists are mainly driven by selective incentives. Activist grievances also play a prominent role in the social movement literature in explaining support for collective action (McAdam 1986, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003; Tarrow 2011; Simmons 2014). Both literatures, however, focus on mobilization primarily

against state actors, not in support of them.¹ Drawing on these literatures, we explore whether political activism and activist-driven grievances might induce individuals to volunteer for military service in the context of a counter-insurgency effort. We argue that political activism could help explain who volunteers for service as well as who complies with conscription efforts. If civilians mobilize for insurgency on behalf of activist-driven causes, could activism drive individuals to join counter-insurgency movements as well?

Theory and Hypotheses

During wartime, governments could face considerable military recruitment challenges. Ordinary citizens may be less inclined to join the military during conflict, and preferences for fighting may also depend on the type of threat and the degree of threat posed. In general, we assume collective action problems in

¹ Some forms of political and civic engagement have been linked to military mobilization. Sander and Putnam (2010) find heightened political engagement and volunteerism among young people and the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) also reported an 8 per cent increase in military enlistment in the year after the September 11th attacks, and DoD publications attribute the rise in recruitment to the attacks (see Daniel 2011 as an example).

recruitment efforts. Individual incentives to free ride may increase under the threat of war, especially when facing formidable adversaries (though see Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). States may also have varying capacities to offer selective incentives or enforce coercive efforts (such as conscription) to overcome those free rider problems. When governments are limited in both carrot/stick capacities for recruitment and where personal costs of fighting may be severe, what induces ordinary citizens to fight?

We consider the role that prior political activism might play in mobilizing civilians for violence. We argue that prior activism could be important to explaining mobilization when potential risks and costs are high and governments have limited ability to offer selective incentives or coercive measures to induce mobilization. We test the following hypothesis:

H1 (Political Activism): Prior political activism increases the likelihood of mobilizing for military combat.

How could prior activism lead people to join the military? We argue that political grievances underlying activism could enhance one's willingness to engage in higher risk/higher cost forms of violent collective action (Tarrow 2011, Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Grievances can be defined as having cause for complaint against others for perceived wrongs or injustices (Miller and Sarat 1980). In the

social movement literature, grievances consist of the “central claims a social movement is making – the practices, policies, or phenomena that movement members claim they are working to change (or preserve)” (Simmons 2014: 515).

Given that grievances could be expressed in myriad ways, why might individuals turn to violent collective action? One possibility is that humans are hard-wired to engage in violence when aggrieved (Chagnon 1988; McCullough et. al. 2015). Collective action provides an opportunity for violent retribution against a perceived adversary or transferring retribution onto others (Berkowitz 1989). People may also resort to violence when there has been some breakdown in the formal rule of law and the source of their grievances cannot be rectified through non-violent means (O’Donnell 2004). Entrepreneurial elites may also find opportunity to stoke fears and tensions to mobilize aggrieved activists for violent causes (de Figueiredo and Weingaist 1999).

In the context of military recruitment for counter-insurgency, what types of activist-oriented grievances might compel people to fight? We focus on activist grievances that could be linked to insurgent groups and their supporters.² We see insurgency and counter-insurgency as a possible extension and escalation of prior

² In contrast, work by Kalyvas (2006) shows that grievances are not always clearly linked to the ostensible goals of battling insurgency. Fighting provides some with opportunities for unrelated score settling against others.

forms of contentious politics based on salient political and/or social cleavages (McAdams 1986; Tarrow 2011, Tilly and Tarrow 2015). People agitate, mobilize, and counter-mobilize in response to specific acts of political exclusion, social or economic inequality, religious or other identity-driven forms of persecution, or out of direct personal experiences of victimization at the hands of political actors and their supporters (Gurr 1970). We consider whether activist-grievances against insurgents can be viewed as an escalation of prior contentious politics.

What types of grievances might lead to mobilization? One possibility we consider is that activist grievances are parochial or ethno-national in nature. Peterson (2002) in particular has pointed to the role of collective fears, hatreds, and resentments in driving civil conflict, especially along ethnic and sectarian lines. In conflicts with strong ethnic, sectarian, or regional cleavages, parochial individuals with elevated in-group ties and out-group aversions may select into both activist and combatant roles, as either insurgents or as defenders of the regime (Sambanis et. al. 2012, Souleimanov et. al. 2015). Another possibility is that conflict cuts across ethnic lines and the sources of contentious politics are more political than parochial (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The presence of cross-cutting cleavages could explain why people may mobilize for reasons other than ethnic, sectarian or other parochial causes (Chandra 2006).

Finally, what is the process by which individuals transform from aggrieved activists to military combatants? We consider a mechanism where

political activism enhances a sense of agency, empowerment, and self-efficacy that leads activists to discount the risks of violence and become more favorable to violent collective action to achieve their goals. At the individual level, prospect theory illustrates how individuals are more likely to take risks to prevent future losses, especially when they feel self-empowered to affect outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Krueger and Dickson 1994; Tezcur 2015). Furthermore, research on optimism bias shows that individuals are also often prone to take risks when they overestimate their chances of winning and discount the possibility of losing (Weinstein 1980; Bracha and Brown 2012). Young males appear to be especially prone to overconfidence and risk-taking when engaging in aggressive behavior (Apicella 2008; Johnson et. al. 2006). The social movement literature also underscores the propensity for close-knit, densely affiliated activists with strong grievances to transition from low-risk to increasingly high-risk/high-cost forms of collective action to achieve their goals (McAdam 1986; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Victimization, through prior activism, might also lead people to resort to violence as a means of self-empowerment (Beck 1999; Orth et. al. 2006).

To summarize, we explore links between prior political activism and military mobilization. We attempt to unpack activist motives into parochial and political components. To illustrate how prior activism leads to military mobilization, we will examine how activism encourages a sense of self-efficacy, over-confidence, and risk taking that leads activists to support more violent forms

of collective action to address their goals and grievances. We also account for alternative explanations for military mobilization based on selective incentives related to income and opportunity costs (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). We now discuss our rationale for case selection in more detail below.

Rationale for Case Selection

While many militaries around the world engage in recruitment efforts, we saw a window of opportunity in the emerging crisis in Ukraine to examine our hypothesis at the onset of a major campaign to mobilize civilians for military combat. We chose to conduct our study in Ukraine for several reasons.

First, Ukraine faced a number of internal and external political crises that necessitated a rapid mobilization effort. Ukraine was deeply destabilized by a series of political shocks since November 2013. First came the Euromaidan protests and ultimate ouster of President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014. This was followed almost immediately by the annexation of Crimea by the Russian military and anti-government demonstrations by ethnic Russians in several regions. Clashes with authorities turned especially violent in the Donbas regions of Donetsk and Lugansk where separatists proclaimed independence from Ukraine in April 2014. In this volatile environment, Ukraine provides a useful

case for the study of military mobilization during an ongoing political crisis with the threat of further conflict.

Second, Ukraine is limited in its capacity to mobilize forces using either selective incentives or coercive measures. Ukraine relies on a combination of volunteerism and conscription-based recruitment for its counter-insurgency efforts. On May 1, 2014, faced with escalating crises, acting Ukrainian President Oleksander Turchynov re-initiated conscription for military service, which had been de-activated the previous year. His decree states that “Ukrainian male citizens who are physically qualified for military service, over 18 years old and older, but who have not reached the age of 25, and who have no right for exemption from military service” will be conscripted.³ Among the reasons he gave for the re-instatement of the draft were the “deteriorating situation in the east and south of Ukraine ... activities of illegally formed armed pro-Russian groups,

³ By law, all young men in Ukraine undergo a physical exam at the age of 16 to assess their qualification for service. This exam is conducted in the 10th grade at local schools, and medical records are maintained by local recruitment offices. Young men may be exempted from the draft for medical or religious reasons and may be granted a deferral while attending college, living abroad, or due to certain family-related hardships. The law is ambiguous about exemptions based on sexual orientation.

the seizure and blockade of the state administration buildings, military administration facilities, military bases...” and “interference of the Russian Federation into the interior affairs of Ukraine”.⁴ Draft notices were sent out across the county, and those who do not report to their local recruitment offices were threatened with fines and imprisonment.⁵ In practice, however, Ukraine has a poor history of enforcing conscription. Since the 1990s, reports indicate that less than 10% who received conscription notices ever reported for duty, which was one of the reasons ousted President Viktor Yanukovich sought to end the draft the previous year and transform Ukraine’s military into a voluntary professional army.⁶ In July 2014, when our study began, young men across Ukraine were

⁴ As reported in <http://president.gov.ua/news/30329.html>;
<http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/pope-urges-putin-commit-sincere-great-effort-ukraine-peace-n373206>; <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27247428>

⁵ As reported in <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/10/ukraine-draft-dodgers-jail-kiev-struggle-new-fighters>

⁶ Many seek to avoid military service due to fears about hazing and abuse commonly referred to as “dedovschina”, which is common to both the Russian and Ukrainian military. In addition to legal means of obtaining exemptions/deferments, some pay bribes to physicians to grant them medical

receiving draft notices and newly elected President Petro Poroshenko continued to press for increased recruitment to deal with the ongoing separatist crisis in the east.⁷ At the time of our study, the military was focusing on recruiting 18-25 year olds but was facing challenges in implementing a nationwide draft.⁸

Third, Ukraine's counter-insurgency efforts are ongoing, and those who mobilize for combat face considerable risks and uncertain outcomes. The insurgency in eastern Ukraine prompted the Ukrainian government to counter-mobilize for what they refer to as an "Anti-Terrorist Operation" or ATO.⁹ This mobilization effort was also deeply flawed from the onset. The Ukrainian military was plagued by a shortage of supplies and manpower. The inability of the

exemptions or ignore draft notices. As reported in

[http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/10/03/Ukraine-to-end-military-conscription-after-autumn-call-ups/UPI-95521380772920/;](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/10/03/Ukraine-to-end-military-conscription-after-autumn-call-ups/UPI-95521380772920/)

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad2f23.html>

⁷ See <http://uatoday.tv/politics/president-petro-poroshenko-issued-a-decree-about-military-mobilization-402754.html>.

⁸ See <http://www.ibtimes.com/ukraine-military-conscription-goal-25000-soldiers-not-met-more-waves-army-draft-2071065>

⁹ See <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/04/ukraine-launches-anti-terrorist-operation-201441363951423315.html>

Ukrainian military to enforce conscription effectively meant that those who report for military service are doing so on a voluntary basis. In the summer of 2014, the government was relying primarily on volunteer battalions and National Guard units comprised of civilians, who were pushed onto the battlefields of the east with little more than a week's training, with many forced to raise their own supplies.¹⁰ Since the completion of our study, the Ukrainian government has shifted strategy away from conscripting raw 18-25 recruits, and instead focusing on those 26-60 with prior military training and experience. This shift was done in part due to the failure of the conscription efforts and limited capacity to quickly train inexperienced recruits. Hence, there is strong evidence that volunteerism was outpacing conscription in the recruitment process at the time of our study. We investigate what motivates civilians to volunteer.

Fourth, Ukraine offered us a rare opportunity to access military recruits. When we conducted our research, Ukrainian military recruitment centers were very open and unrestrictive, providing us with an opportunity to interview young recruits as they come to the centers to enlist. In the case of our recruitment center, it was very clear that these young men would be headed for combat. Within five hours of arriving at the recruitment center, recruits were loaded onto buses and

¹⁰ <https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/ukraines-military-efforts-hampered-limited-support>

transported to the eastern front in Donbas for training. Therefore, we are able to capture a snapshot of a young person's thoughts and impressions at a critical moment – at the recruitment station where they make the first transition from an ordinary civilian to active duty military.

Finally, beyond access and opportunity rationales, Ukraine provides an opportunity to examine *activist* motives for violence (Weinstein 2006). In the context of Ukraine, how might Euro-maidan political activism against the Yanukovich regime spillover into counter-insurgency mobilization against Donbas separatists? To explain the linkages between Maidan activism and Donbas mobilization, we consider a parochial and political cleavage-based explanation.

According to the parochial model, Maidan protests and Donbas counter-insurgency were both born out of contentious ethnic grievances. Ukraine contains a sizable minority of ethnic Russians, who based on the 2001 census, comprise 17% of the population, but are more concentrated around the Black Sea regions of Crimea (59%) and Odessa (29%), and the eastern regions of Donbas (39%) and Kharkiv (26%) bordering Russia. The parochial model suggests that the Maidan protests, Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, and the rise of Russian separatists in Donbas pitted ethnic Ukrainians against ethnic Russians. The parochial model views Maidan political activism as an expression of parochial

ethnocentrism and ultra-nationalism in the ethnic Ukrainian community.¹¹ The willingness of Maidan activists to mobilize for counter-insurgency in Donbas is a function of their parochial ethnic-nationalism and aversion to ethnic Russians.

There is reason, however, to be skeptical of the parochial explanation. We acknowledge that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, concerns about ethnic tensions in Ukraine were highlighted by Posen (1993), Bremmer (1994), Tishkov (1997), and Suny (1998), and Laitin (1998) early on. However, there is an ongoing debate on the extent to which ethnic cleavages are salient in Ukrainian politics and society, how important they are, and whether divisions that exist are a product of language (Fournier 2002, Kulyk 2011), regionalism (Birch 2000, O'Loughlin 2001), a combination thereof (Barrington 2002, Barrington and Farranda 2009) or driven by meaningful party and policy cleavages such as European integration (Frye 2015, Kuzio 2015a). So far, violence in Ukraine has not been linked to increased ethnic tensions in the general population (Coupé and Obrizan 2015). Recent research also suggests that insurgent unrest in Eastern Ukraine may be more a function of economic shocks related to the 2008 global recession and disruption of export ties to Russia than enduring ethnic rivalries (de Haas et. al. 2015; Zhukov 2015).

¹¹ As evidenced by the participation of ultra-nationalist groups like Pravyi Sektor in Maidan activism (Shekhovtsov and Umland. 2014)

In contrast to the parochial model, we explore an alternative explanation based on ongoing political cleavages over Ukraine's relationship between Europe and Russia. We situate the Euromaidan protests and Donbas violence into a broader historical period of evolving contentious politics along this issue cleavage (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). In particular, Kuzio (2015a) details how the political violence of the Euromaidan and Donbas conflicts evolved from lower-level contentious politics going back to the 1980s that deepened following the 2004 Orange Revolution and escalated thereafter between supporters and opponents of Viktor Yanukovich (Wilson 2005; Kuzio 2010). Before the Maidan protest began, the Donbas region of Ukraine provided a critical electoral base for Yanukovich and his Party of Regions, and support for Russia was strong (Osipian and Osipian 2006). In the aftermath of Maidan violence, Frye (2015) finds that economic orientation toward Europe versus Russia, rather than ethnicity or language cleavages, had become the primary point of contention between Yanukovich supporters and opponents. Of course, the Maidan protests themselves originated in response to President Yanukovich's decision to oppose an association agreement with the European Union in favor of the Customs Union with Russia, a move which was widely favored in the Donbas region (Diuk 2014).

Yanukovych's ouster in February 2014 was followed almost immediately by anti-government demonstrations and separatist calls in Donbas.¹²

In the aftermath of Maidan protests, Russia also played a critical role in intensifying Maidan-related political divisions in Ukraine. Russia openly supported Yanukovych during and after the Maidan crisis and crackdown, ultimately offering him sanctuary. With a pro-Western government now in control in Kiev, Russia moved in retaliation to annex Crimea and stoked tensions in Donbas by openly encouraging and covertly supporting separatist movements (Bachman and Lyubashenko 2014; Mitrokhin 2015; Kuzio 2015b; Katchanovski 2016; Laruelle 2016).¹³ Some argue that Russia may have provoked the separatist conflict in Donbas out of fear that Maidan activism would bolster pro-Western groups in Moscow (Horvath 2015). Others argue that Russia actions in Crimea and Donbas were in response to fears of Ukraine's likely EU and NATO expansion (Mearsheimer 2014; Tsygankov 2015). In either scenario, the origins of the Donbas conflict find expression in the origins and outcome of the prior Euro-Maidan crisis.

In summary, to explain how Maidan activism leads to Donbas mobilization, we place the Donbas insurgency in a continuum of escalating

¹² Since the Maidan, Russian separatist leaders in Donbas have distanced themselves from Yanukovych and his party.

¹³ Separatist leaders disavow any military or economic assistance from Russia.

contentious politics between pro-Western Maidan activists and pro-Russia supporters in the Donbas. We argue that the initial success of Maidan protests had a self-empowering effect on activists, who demonstrated a willingness to engage in high risk/high cost mobilization to further their goals (McAdam 1986). The willingness of activists to mobilize against Russian separatists in Donbas is also consistent with prospect theory on the propensity for individuals to take risks to prevent future losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) especially when they feel empowered to affect outcomes (Tezcur 2015). Ukrainian political elites were also aggressively mobilizing for counter-insurgency in the immediate aftermath of the surge of Maidan activism and had incentives to convey military mobilization as a continuation of Maidan goals and causes: Ukraine's struggle between a future in Europe or domination by Russia.¹⁴

Generalizing beyond Ukraine, we ask whether prior political activism offers insights into military mobilization during conflict. We examine war-time recruitment efforts in a weak, semi-democratic regime with limited military and economic capability facing threats from both an internal regional, ethnic insurgency and a more powerful external state actor. We consider Ukraine a compelling case to study the role of prior political activism in mobilization,

¹⁴ See also Karagiannis (2016) for hypotheses that strong emotional and political ideations linked to Euro-Maidan activism could be driving military recruitment.

because the government lacks the capacity to offer carrots or sticks to incentivize recruitment via financial inducements or forced conscription and must rely in part on volunteerism. Under such constraints, we ask what role prior activism and activist-driven grievances might play as an inducement in the mobilization process. Our results speak to the challenges of military recruitment in states with limited institutional capacities.

Research Design

Conducting research on military combatants is challenging for a number of reasons. Due to government restrictions, gaining access to military personnel is often extremely difficult. There are also further restrictions and prohibitions on what military personnel may reveal about the nature of their duties due to the sensitive nature of military activities. There is also the problem of socialization and social desirability bias. It is difficult to know whether active duty military are speaking freely or whether they are simply reporting what they know to be acceptable responses for fear of reprimand from superiors. In summary, most militaries operate in a highly controlled and restrictive environment that poses challenges for social science research. The crisis in Ukraine offered us a unique opportunity to conduct this study in a less constrained environment where we hoped individuals would be more inclined to speak freely and openly.

In addition, most research on mobilization for violence is conducted retrospectively, not at the onset of conflict or while conflict is ongoing and outcomes are uncertain. On one hand, retrospective studies may provide people with clarity, enhancing their ability to reflect openly and honestly on their role and motivations in a conflict (Kalyvas 2006). However, retrospective studies may also be subject to recall biases, as past behavior is interpreted through the frame of conflict outcomes, “collective memories” and “moral rationalizations” (Tsang 2002; Safer et. al. 2002; Harris et. al. 2008).

We seek to address these challenges by interviewing individuals at the moment when they enter into combatant roles. We interview prospective recruits at a military recruitment station as they prepare to enlist for active combat duty – battlefield deployment in a counter-insurgency operation in Eastern Ukraine. For comparison, we also interview civilians in the proximity of the recruitment station, who have chosen not to join the mobilization effort. We restrict our sample to young men of age 18-27, consistent with those who were being targeted by the Ukrainian government for recruitment.

By examining individual attitudes at the onset of military service, our approach minimizes risks to both enumerator and subject, because we do not attempt to approach soldiers in hostile, combat environments. We also seek to limit the influence of socialization effects from the experience of group bonding during basic training, integration into military life, and the harsh conditions of

field combat. This is important because we suspect that survey responses could be sensitive to time, place, and context. Asking former combatants to recall motivations and preferences years after a conflict has ended could lead to under-reporting, especially if war-time rivals have long since reconciled. During conflict, combatant preferences may also be affected by events experienced on the battlefield. There is also selection bias on survivors in retrospective studies.

To identify motives for political activism and military mobilization, we employ a survey instrument and several lab-in-the-field experiments. Our survey is wide ranging. We begin with a battery of questions to evaluate their emotional state. We then collect basic demographic information. We ask recruits directly “Why are you joining the Ukrainian army?”¹⁵ We also use indirect questions to

¹⁵ To what extent can we trust the responses of either military recruits or civilians? Conducting interviews at a military recruitment station could result in social desirability, priming, and demand effects. Civilians may have incentives not to be forthcoming about their intentions not to join the military for fear of being reported to authorities. Due to the challenges of gaining access to military recruitment stations, our sample is too small to conduct more sophisticated analysis of response sensitivity using list or endorsement experiments, which require randomization into treatment and control groups (Bullock et. al. 2011). However, our enumerator ensured respondents that we would not collect any

probe for activist driven preferences, motives for joining the military and explore pathways through which activism may manifest into support for violent collective action (self-efficacy, risk tolerance, support for violence). We also control for plausible selective incentives and opportunity costs that might confound activist-based explanations for military mobilization.

Sampling and Data Collection

Our research was conducted in the month of July 2014 in Kharkiv (Kharkov in Russian) – a large industrial town in a region bordering both Russia and the Donbas separatist republics.¹⁶ Kharkiv was a logical choice since it was serving as a major recruitment center due to its large population center and proximity to the front. We surveyed 100 young men at a military recruitment station in Kharkiv, as well as 100 young men who lived within the vicinity of the recruitment station. At this particular recruitment station, all servicemen were headed directly to the front for a week of basic training followed by battlefield

information that could be used to identify them (protecting both privacy and anonymity), and at the end of the survey, over 92% reported that they felt comfortable answering our questions.

¹⁶ See map in SI Figure 1.

deployment. In most cases, they were placed on buses to the front within hours of arriving at the recruitment station. It was in this brief window that we conducted our interviews. Our enumerator conducted interviews in waves, identifying clusters of new recruits and randomly selecting no more than 5 to interview during a single period. Each interview took between 30 and 45 minutes to complete. For each interview, the enumerator would find a location near the recruitment station where there were reasonable expectations of privacy. Other recruits were not allowed to be present during the interview. Our enumerator obtained permission from authorities at the recruitment station to conduct the interviews, but they did not interfere with the interview process and were never present during an interview.¹⁷ Interviews with civilian non-combatants were conducted using a random route technique, screening for young males between 18 and 27 with a limit to one per household in school districts within proximity to the

¹⁷ Authorities in the recruitment station were largely indifferent to our presence. They understood we were conducting a social survey about attitudes and reasons for joining the military, and we were not collecting potentially sensitive information about military deployments. Our interviewer was a local ethnic Ukrainian male, fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian.

recruitment station.¹⁸ Table 1 below indicates that our sample is demographically well-balanced using nonparametric Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Young men in our fighting group and civilian samples are from comparable age, educational, and urban/rural backgrounds.¹⁹ Our sampling strategy appears to have captured young men from very similar backgrounds living in the same communities with one another.²⁰

¹⁸ We used school districts as primary sampling units because schools are commonly used for military registration and assessment purposes prior to the age of 18. This research design received IRB approval.

¹⁹ All recruits in the study also self-identified as ethnic Ukrainians, but all also spoke Russian, which is common in Kharkiv. Because recruits did not identify as ethnic Russians, we restricted the sample of civilians to ethnic Ukrainians. The ethnic Russian population of Kharkiv is 43% according to the 2001 census. This in itself is noteworthy that ethnic Russians did not appear to be mobilizing for deployment to fight Russian separatists in neighboring Donbas.

²⁰ One possibility is that our inferences are highly sensitive to locational context. Individuals in Kharkiv may differ in important ways from other regions of Ukraine. Unfortunately, limited resources and access to recruitment centers prevented us from expanding our sample size. Population inferences are difficult in research on military recruitment and political activism due to selection bias and

Table 1 About Here

Empirical Strategy

To assess prior political activism and activist-based grievances, we pose questions to recruits to understand the range of reasons and rationales they may have for joining the Ukrainian army. We also ask them to consider why others might be joining to see how they evaluate their own motivations relative to perceived norms and conventions for joining. We then turn to logit regression models, where our key dependent variable of interest is the logistic transformation of the binary variable (Y_i) denoting whether individual (i) enlists = 1 or does not = 0. Our key explanatory variables (A_i) consists of behavioral and attitudinal measures of Maidan political activism while (X_i) is a vector of extended controls. Among controls, we test our activism hypothesis against other selective incentives for mobilization by controlling for age, education, villagers, and employment

small-N samples of activists and recruits relative to the general population. Rather, our research is exploratory. We ask whether we can find evidence of activist-based motives for military recruitment in a small-sample comparison.

background as proxies for underlying financial incentives and opportunity costs for joining in the military.

$$\ln(\pi / 1 - \pi) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 A_i + \beta_2 X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\text{where } \pi = \Pr(Y_i = 1 \mid X_i)$$

Of course, all our variables are observational in nature, not randomly assigned. Causal inference is hampered by endogeneity and selection bias. However, we can increase confidence in our results using extended controls to deal with selection on observables. Finally, the Ukrainian draft would ideally serve as a meaningful treatment for coercive pressures to enlist, but we do not have any way to independently assess who received draft notices and who did not, and civilians have incentives not to be forthcoming about whether they received such notices.²¹ Hence, we cannot directly test the impact of the conscription regime. However, if recruits are primarily forced conscripts as opposed to willful volunteers, then this

²¹ We were told my military representatives at the recruitment offices that all young men of military age should have received conscription notices in the areas where we sampled. They are then required to opt-out for legal reasons based on physical or psychological fitness for duty, college or hardship deferments as stipulated by Ukrainian law.

should predict the null hypothesis (H0) that *political activism among new recruits does not differ from the civilian population*. They are only serving out of a compulsory obligation, not due to prior political activism or a heightened sense of activist-driven grievances.²²

Analysis

We begin by examining stated rationales for joining the counter-insurgency effort. We asked recruits to indicate from a range of options why they decided to join the Ukrainian military, then to indicate the most important reason for joining among options provided. We also gave them the opportunity to include other reasons not listed (see SI Tables 1-2 for response details). Among the 100 recruits we sampled, none state that they felt compelled to join as a result of the draft. They all claim to be volunteers. Also, none directly referenced the Maidan protests as a reason for joining the military, nor were they primed to think about

²² The null hypothesis should also be true if civilians in our sample simply have not received conscription notices or were simply planning to enlist but had yet to do so.

their views or involvement in Maidan by prior survey items.²³ To probe for Maidan-related motives for joining, we turn to self-reported behavior and attitudinal measures of political activism.

Our primary source of prior political activism is participation in Maidan protests.²⁴ We assess the extent to which recruits differ from other men within their age cohort and community, who have not opted for military service. In Figure 1, we report the average marginal effects of Maidan participation on the likelihood of joining the Ukrainian military based on logit regression analysis.

²³ The majority (61%) claim that they are joining “to help restore law and order in Ukraine”. Almost half (45%) also say they are fighting “to prevent enemies of Ukraine from taking control of more territory”. Only 16% claim they are motivated “by revenge”. However, when we ask recruits why they think *others* are joining, more than half (51%) believe they are doing so out of a desire “for revenge”, and a plurality (38%) believe this is the main reason others are joining the counter-insurgency effort. The discrepancy in motives could be a result of social desirability bias. Recruits would rather present themselves as patriots defending the nation, rather than revenge-seekers or score-settlers.

²⁴ We acknowledge that Maidan participation itself could be linked to other prior forms of political activism or civic engagement. See Onuch (2014).

The dependent variable is coded 0 for civilians and 1 for army recruits.²⁵ This and other subsequent regression models include extended controls for age, education, whether the subject is from Kharkiv city or a nearby village, and whether the subject was employed in a professional or service sector position before enlisting, a student, or a skilled/unskilled manual laborer, which serves as a proxy for underlying financial incentives and opportunity costs to joining.

Figure 1 About Here

The results from Figure 1 suggests that our political activism hypothesis (H1) has merit. Individuals who participated in the Maidan protests are over four times more likely to join the military than non-Maidan protesters in our sample.²⁶ We further validate support for H1 by building an index of Maidan political activism based on ten items from our survey: protest participation, exposure to violence and injury during the protests, support for the Maidan protests and

²⁵ Although absolute marginal effects could be sensitive to sample size, they are still useful for comparing the relative strength of different measures of political activism between combatants and civilians.

²⁶ Odds ratio = 4.17. Average Marginal effect (0.31, $p < 0.000$), Predictive Probabilities (Pr0 = 0.28, Pr1 = 0.62).

affinity for the protesters, blame attribution to Yanukovych and Vladimir Putin for Maidan-related violence, and political preferences consist with the broad goals of the Maidan protests (support for the EU and NATO membership, opposition to joining the Russian-led Customs Union).²⁷ Factor analysis indicates that these items line up strongly on a single dimension, which we treat as a latent variable of Maidan political activism.²⁸ Each index component also strongly predicts joining the military when regressed in separate logit models with extended controls.²⁹ Figure 2 indicates the average marginal effect of each component of the index on the probability of joining the military. Marginal effects greater than zero indicate a positive effect on joining the military.

Figure 2 About Here

At the onset of military service, Figure 2 reveals that recruits express a history of Maidan political activism and activist-driven views that distinguish them from civilians. Recruits are more likely to support and to have taken part in

²⁷ See SI Table 3 for question wording and coding.

²⁸ Factor 1 Eigenvalue = 3.91, 90% of total variance explained by Factor 1. See SI Table 4 for more details.

²⁹ See SI Tables 5-8.

Maidan protests than civilians. They also feel closer to Maidan supporters than civilians. This would explain their increased exposure to violence and victimization – they were not random bystanders but active participants in the Maidan. Recruits are also more likely than civilians to blame Viktor Yanukovich and his Party of Regions for Maidan violence. However, activist grievances are not limited to the Yanukovich regime. Compared to civilians, soldiers are also much more likely to blame Russian President Vladimir Putin for Maidan violence. Strong preferences for European integration and opposition to Russia’s influence are also consistent with the goals of the Maidan protests (Diuk 2014, Onuch 2014). Recruits are significantly more supportive of Ukrainian membership in the European Union and NATO and opposed to joining Russia’s Custom’s Union than civilians.

Logit regressions in Table 2 confirm that both the binary measure of Maidan participation (Model 1) and the expanded index of Maidan activism (Model 2) are strong predictors of joining the military. Because we are capturing the views of recruits prior to the initiation and socialization into military service and into combat, we can be more confident that these preferences are not simply a consequence of military service and combat experience. Our results are also robust to controls for selective incentives for opportunity costs based on age, education, village, and prior employment in our models.

In contrast, mobilization based on parochial ethnocentric grievances (Model 3) in Table 2 is not supported. To measure ethnocentrism, we develop an index based on responses to eight survey items (Appendix Figure 1). Factor analysis indicates that responses to these items lined up on a single dimension, which we treat as a latent variable for ethnocentrism.³⁰ Including the latent variable for ethnocentrism in Model 3 Table 2, we find no evidence that grievances based on ethnic cleavages predict military mobilization in our sample.

³⁰ Factor 1 Eigenvalue = 1.59, 92% of total variance explained by Factor 1. See SI Tables 9-12 for more details and SI Table 3 for question wording,

Recruits are no more ethnocentric than civilians in either their attitudes³¹ or behavior³².

Table 2 About Here

³¹ We measure in-group ties based on language and ethnicity using a simple social distance scale. Though all our subjects identify as Ukrainians and Ukrainian speakers, recruits do not feel closer to other Ukrainian speakers than do civilians. Recruits also do not feel more distant toward Russian speakers in Ukraine than do civilians. Compared to civilians, recruits do not especially think Russians in Ukraine are disloyal, support Vladimir Putin and Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory, or oppose EU membership. They are also even less likely than civilians to see Russians in Ukraine as enemies.

³² At the start of the survey, all subjects completed a "third-party" dictator game, where they are asked to distribute a sum of money (100 Hryvnia or aprox. \$5) between an anonymous ethnic Ukrainian and an ethnic Russian from Ukraine. The dictator game is commonly used increasingly to measure behavioral treatment of various in-groups vs. out-groups such as ethnicity (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001). Although 40.1% of subjects gave more money to an ethnic Ukrainian over an ethnic Russian, differences in in-group bias between recruits and civilians were not significant.

Instead, military recruits reflect attitudes and behaviors that are consistent with Weinstein's (2006) conception of *activist*-driven motives for fighting and evidence from the social movement literature on the transition to high cost/high risk activism (McAdams 1986). Political grievances against the Yanukovich regime, born out through Maidan political activism, are strong predictors of who is joining the counter-insurgency in Donbas. Hence, prior political activism offers important insights into mobilization for counter-insurgency. The army is drawing into its ranks former Maidan protesters who, while not vengeful against Ukraine's ethnic Russian in general, have strong preferences for European and Western integration and are aggrieved at those who want to increase Russia's influence over Ukraine, especially Viktor Yanukovich and Vladimir Putin, to whom they ascribe blame for the violence. This helps explain why some of those who took part in Maidan protests subsequently mobilized for the counter-insurgency effort against separatists in a heartland of pro-Russia support.

Exploring Causal Mechanisms

What might compel former Maidan activists to engage in high risk military mobilization in Donbas? We explore possible causal mechanisms based on self-efficacy and support for violent collective action. We argue that activism

instills a sense of optimism, agency and empowerment, elevating risk tolerance and support for violent collective action, which leads prior activists to mobilize for violence.

To measure self-efficacy, we construct an index based on emotional affect, risk tolerance, and optimism about the future. Figure 3 reports the average marginal effect of each component in the self-efficacy index based on separate logit regression models where the dependent variable is coded 0 for civilians and 1 for army recruits.³³ We measure positive and negative emotional affect at the beginning of the survey using a variation of the PANAS-X scale (Watson and Clark 1999). Overall, recruits appear to be very enthusiastic at the onset of their military deployments. The scale reveals that recruits display stronger positive affect (happiness, attentiveness, pride) and less negative affect (fear, sadness, anger) than civilians. To measure risk tolerance, we employ two survey items and a variation of a standard risk game from behavioral economics.³⁴ As predicted, we find that recruits are more risk tolerant in both their attitudes toward risk and their behavior than civilians. Finally, we employ three items to assess optimism bias. In

³³ See SI Table 3 for question wording and SI Tables 15-17 for regression models.

³⁴ Ours is a variant of the Eckel-Grossman Risk Game. Subjects decide whether to accept a sure pay-off of 100 Hryvnia or gamble for the possibility of a 500 Hryvnia pay-off. See SI Table 13 for more details.

each item, we find that recruits are significantly more optimistic and (over-)confident than civilians. Consistent with our theoretical argument, factor analysis indicates that emotional items, risk tolerance, and optimism align on a single dimension which we combine into a latent variable of self-efficacy.³⁵

Figure 3 About Here

Next, we examine the link between Maidan activism and support for violent collective action. We build an index of support for violent collective action based on responses to ten items in our survey that measure support for violence in Donbas, support for external military intervention, and opposition to peace negotiations.

Figure 4 reports the average marginal effects of each component of the index on the probability of joining the military in separate logistic regressions with extended controls.³⁶ We find evidence that army recruits are more supportive of violent collective action than civilians. Army recruits are more likely than civilians to blame Russia for the Donbas conflict, to see Russia as an

³⁵ Factor 1 Eigenvalue = 1.69, 91% of total variance explained by Factor 1. See SI Table 14 for more details.

³⁶ See SI Tables 19-21 for regression models.

enemy of Ukraine, favor using force against Russia, and favor using force to retake lost territory. They are also more likely to support the expansion of the conflict to include Western military intervention and are less willing than civilians to negotiate with Russia in the interests of peace. Finally, recruits are more doubtful than civilians on the prospects of bargaining with Russia. They hold the line against making any concessions that infringe on Ukraine's territorial sovereignty. They are much more skeptical than civilians that talks with Russia will resolve the current conflict peacefully, and they fear Russian intentions to take more territory in the future.³⁷ Factor analysis indicate that responses to these items align clearly on a single dimension, which we use to create a latent variable for support for violent collective action.³⁸

Figure 4 About Here

When we include our indices of self-efficacy and support for violent collective action in regression models in Table 3, we find that self-efficacy and support for violent collective action are strongly inter-correlated with one another

³⁷ See SI Table 3 for question wording.

³⁸ Factor 1 eigenvalue = 2.40, 70% of total variance explained by Factor 1. See SI Table 18 for more details.

(Model 1), with Maidan political activism (Models 2 and 3), and with military mobilization (Models 4 and 5). This suggests that self-efficacy and support for violent collective action may serve as plausible mediators of the effect of Maidan activism on military mobilization. Causal mediation analysis indicates that 61% of the effect of Maidan Activism on Military Mobilization is mediated by our self-efficacy index, while 50% is mediated by support for violent collective action. Further sensitivity analysis indicates that the mediating effects of self-efficacy and support for violent collective action would not be easily confounded by unobservables.³⁹ Overall, our analysis suggests that those who felt empowered by participating in Maidan protests are more supportive of violent collective action and now find themselves mobilizing for counter-insurgency. Our results support recent empirical work on self-efficacy, risk tolerance, and mobilization for violence and suggest a causal pathway for mobilization into increasingly higher risk collective action (Tezcur 2015).

Discussion and Conclusion

³⁹ Establishing causal mechanisms from observational data are challenging given violations of the sequential ignorability assumptions of mediation analysis (Imai et. al. 2010). Our analysis is highly exploratory due to endogeneity between explanatory variables and proposed mediators. See SI Table 22 for more details.

What drives ordinary civilians to commit to military service? When governments face insurgent threats, we find that prior political activism can play an important role in mobilizing citizens for counter-insurgency warfare. Civilians who harbor activist-driven political grievances are more likely to enlist in military service. To the extent that the literature tends to stress selective incentives and underlying structural conditions to predict who selects into combat, our observations about political activism and activist-driven grievances are noteworthy.⁴⁰

In general, we do not find that recruits in our sample represent a clear underclass of Ukrainian society. In terms of economic background and education, they look similar to their civilian male counterparts. What does distinguish them are their experiences of prior Maidan activism. Consistent with Weinstein's (2006) conception of *activist*-driven motives for violence, new recruits were active supporters of the Maidan revolution that ousted President Yanukovich and his Party of Regions from power. Consistent with the social movement literature

⁴⁰ Here we are not claiming that other explanations based on structural or selective incentives are somehow unimportant. Rather, we provide evidence for why activists and their political grievances should not be discounted in theoretical accounts for why people mobilize for violence.

on the transition to from low to high cost/high risk collective action (McAdam 1986; McAdam et al. 2001), we find that military mobilization in Donbas can be seen as an escalation of prior arenas contentious politics. We also explore causal mechanisms and find support for the argument that people who feel empowered by prior political activism become more risk tolerant and supportive of violent collective action, leading them into military mobilization. Military recruits in our study feel more self-empowered, have higher risk tolerance, and are more supportive of violent collective action than comparable civilian males.

In contrast, we do not find strong evidence that parochial ethnic biases are driving individuals to mobilize against ethnic Russians. Recruits in the study were no more or less biased than civilians, but we acknowledge that our results could be contingent on high levels of inter-group contact and tolerance in the ethnically mixed region of Kharkov.⁴¹ Parochial motivations might be more salient in less cosmopolitan regions of Ukraine. However, our results are encouraging that political orientation toward Europe vs. Russia, not ethnicity, language, or religion,

⁴¹ A long line of research shows how inter-group contact can reduce ethnic tensions (Allport 1979, Pettigrew and Trop 2008). High inter-group contact between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Kharkiv may be driving our null findings about ethnocentrism, Maidan activism, and military mobilization.

are the primary cleavages in the current conflict, in which case, ethnic Ukrainian and Russian may quickly reconcile if peace talks succeed.⁴²

However, we also find that military servicemen are more skeptical and less committed to negotiating for peace than civilians. It is well-known at the macro-level that many civil conflicts, once started, are difficult to resolve, negotiated settlements to conflict are generally challenging to maintain, and risks of recurrent violence are often high (Walter 2004, Fortna 2004a). At the micro-level, we argue that activist-based grievances could explain why some conflicts are so intractable. Grievances reduce trust and restrict the bargaining space that individuals are willing to accept in negotiating for peace. While conflict outcomes are ultimately determined by policy-makers, their willingness to negotiate for peace may be encouraged or constrained by the preferences of sub-state actors (ex. Trumbore 1998). This could have important implications for conflict duration and outcome if soldiers are not committed to a peace process. Such preferences could help explain why cease-fire violations are so common (Fortna 2004b). Activists on the battlefield may undermine diplomatic efforts at the negotiating

⁴² We only have data on one side in this conflict. We do not know the preferences of Russian-speakers or supporters of the separatist movements in Donbas.

table.⁴³ We see evidence now that the current ceasefires under the Minsk agreement has been consistently violated.

In conclusion, we find that, as with insurgencies, prior political activism and activist-driven grievances can play an important role in determining who fights, especially in regards to counter-insurgency efforts. Our study at the onset of military mobilization is timely because activist motivations may be difficult to estimate from retrospective studies of violence, where people view their behavior through the lens of conflict experiences and outcomes and due selection bias on survivors. As such, we offer an insightful window into the preferences of citizen-soldiers as they mobilize for war. It also provides a useful baseline for tracking changes in preferences during and in the aftermath of violence both within the fighting and civilian population for future study.

⁴³ Cease-fire violations have posed major challenges for efforts to resolve the conflict in Donbas. See <http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-osce-fighting-at-worrying-levels/27704264.html>.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Fighters	Civilians	Mann-Whitney Fighter> Civilian	KS-balance
	Mean (SD) N = 100	Mean (SD) N = 100		
Age	22.62 (2.08)	22.32 (2.39)	0.94	0.11
Education	3.86 (0.43)	3.87 (0.42)	-0.22	0.01
Rural/Villagers	0.45 (0.50)	0.42 (0.50)	0.14	0.01
Professional	0.52 (0.50)	0.59 (0.49)	-0.99	0.07
Laborer	0.23 (0.04)	0.26 (0.04)	-0.49	0.03
Student	0.23 (0.04)	0.15 (0.04)	-1.44	0.08
Unemployed	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	1.42	0.02

Figure 1. Effects of Maidan Participation on Military Mobilization





Figure 2. Effects of Maidan Activism on Military Mobilization



1 = Maidan Participation, 2 = Blame Attribution, 3 = Activist-driven Goals


Table 2. Regression Analysis of Maidan Activism on Military Mobilization

DV =	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Military Mobilization		
Maidan participation	1.430*** (0.334)		
Maidan activism		0.887*** (0.249)	
Ethnocentrism			-0.179 (0.184)
age	0.126* (0.0728)	0.114 (0.0742)	0.121* (0.0701)
education	-0.124 (0.420)	-0.146 (0.361)	-0.00543 (0.356)
village	0.317 (0.327)	0.300 (0.325)	0.217 (0.311)
professional	-0.915** (0.418)	-0.755* (0.404)	-0.887** (0.407)
laborer	-0.713 (0.475)	-0.287 (0.480)	-0.863* (0.465)
Constant	-2.745 (2.295)	-1.702 (2.096)	-2.078 (2.091)
Observations	200	200	200
adj. r2	0.0954	0.101	0.0259
ll	-125.4	-124.6	-135.0

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Figure 3. Effects of Self-Efficacy, Risk Tolerance on Military Mobilization



1 = Emotional Affect, 2 = Risk Tolerance, 3 = Optimism Bias

Figure 4. Effects of Support for Violent Collective Action on Military

Mobilization



1 = Support for Donbas Violence, 2 = Support for External Military Intervention,
3 = Opposition to Peace Negotiations

Table 3. Possible Mediators between Maidan Activism and Military Mobilization

DV =	(1) Support for Violence	(2)	(3) Maidan Activism	(4)	(5) Military Mobilization
Self-efficacy	0.620*** (0.0553)	0.383*** (0.0571)		2.035*** (0.253)	
Support for violence			0.560*** (0.0626)		1.104*** (0.191)
age	0.0283 (0.0240)	0.000944 (0.0298)	-0.0128 (0.0258)	0.0494 (0.0852)	0.0502 (0.0783)
education	0.164 (0.101)	0.145 (0.211)	0.0570 (0.204)	-0.223 (0.370)	-0.257 (0.369)
village	-0.101 (0.112)	-0.0691 (0.128)	-0.00454 (0.113)	-0.0731 (0.396)	0.251 (0.336)
professional	-0.315** (0.137)	-0.116 (0.162)	0.0387 (0.137)	-0.0922 (0.560)	-0.343 (0.448)
laborer	-0.562*** (0.156)	-0.767*** (0.170)	-0.459*** (0.164)	-1.078* (0.587)	-0.322 (0.503)
Constant	-0.914 (0.616)	(1.027)	(0.989)	0.234 (2.459)	0.0533 (2.174)
N	200	200	200	200	200
adj. r2	0.379	0.173	0.329	0.289	0.145
ll	-212.3	-251.2	-230.2	-98.61	-118.5

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

References

- Allen Bertam S., Jr., Herrmann Douglas, Giles Steven L. 1994. "Vietnam as a Class War: Myth or Reality?" *Sociological Spectrum*. 14(4):299–311.
- Allport, Gordon Willard. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Arjona, Ana M., and Stathis N. Kalyvas. 2011. *Recruitment into Armed Groups in Colombia: A Survey of Demobilized Fighters*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Asch, B. J., Heaton, P., Hosek, J., Martorell, F., Simon, C., & Warner, J. T. 2010. *Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment*. RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST, Santa Monica, CA.
- Bachman Jerald G., Segal David R., Freedman-Doan Peter, O'Malley Patrick M. 2000. "Who Chooses Military Service? Correlates of Propensity and Enlistment in the US Armed Forces." *Military Psychology*. 12(1):1–30.
- Bachmann, Klaus, and Igor Lyubashenko. 2014. "The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign Intervention." *Ukraine's Complex Transition*. Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften. Frankfurt am Main.
- Barber, Alison E. 1998. *Recruiting Employees: Individual and Organizational Perspectives*. Vol. 8. Sage Publications.
- Barrington, Lowell 2002. "Examining Rival Theories of Demographic Influences on Political Support: The Power of Regional, Ethnic, and Linguistic Divisions in Ukraine." *European Journal of Political Research*. 41(4): 455-491.
- Barrington, Lowell and Faranda, Regina. 2009. "Re-Examining Region, Ethnicity, and Language in Ukraine." *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 25(3), 232-256.
- Beck, Aaron T. 1999. *Prisoners of Hate: The Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility, and Violence*. HarperCollins Publishers.

Berkowitz, Leonard. 1989. "Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: Examination and Reformulation." *Psychological Bulletin* 106 (1): 59.

Birch, Sarah. 2000. Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics. *Europe-Asia Studies* 52(6), 1017–1041.

Bremmer, Ian. 1994. "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine." *Europe-Asia Studies* 46(2): 261-283.

Bullock, Will, Kosuke Imai, and Jacob Shapiro. 2011 "Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan." *Political Analysis* 19 (4): 363-384.

Bullock, Will, Kosuke Imai, and Jacob Shapiro. 2011 "Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan." *Political Analysis* 19 (4): 363-384.

Burk, James. 1984. "Patriotism and the All-volunteer Force." *JPMS: Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 12 (2): 229-241.

Carey, Sabine C., Michael P. Colaresi, and Neil J. Mitchell. 2015 "Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(5): 850-876.

Chagnon, Napoleon A. 1988. "Life Histories, Blood Revenge, and Warfare in a Tribal Population." *Science* 239(4843): 985-992.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. "What is ethnic identity and does it matter?." *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (1): 397-424.

Choi, Seung-Whan, and Patrick James. 2003. "No Professional Soldiers, No Militarized Interstate Disputes? A New Question for Neo-Kantianism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(6): 796-816.

Condra, Luke N., and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2012. "Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(1): 167-187.

Coupé, Tom, and Maksym Obrizan. 2015. "Violence and political outcomes in Ukraine—Evidence from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk." *Journal of Comparative*

Economics (forthcoming). Available from
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596715000839>

Daniel, Lisa 2011. "Recruiters Recall Patriotism of Post-9/11 America." *American Forces Press Service*. U.S. Department of Defense. 9/8/2011.
<http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65272>

de Figueiredo Jr, Rui JP, and Barry R. Weingast. 1999. "Rationality of fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict." In Walter, Barbara F., and Jack L. Snyder eds. *Civil wars, insecurity, and intervention*. Columbia University Press.

De Haas, Ralph, Milena Djourelouva, and Elena Nikolova. 2015. "The Great Recession and Social Preferences: Evidence from Ukraine." *Journal of Comparative Economics* (forthcoming). Available from:
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014759671500089X>

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. 2011. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics*. PublicAffairs.

Diuk, Nadia. 2014. "Euromaidan: Ukraine's self-organizing revolution." *World Affairs* 176 (6): 9-17.

Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman. 2008. "Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence." *Handbook of experimental economics results* 1(1): 1061-1073.

Elder, Glen H., Lin Wang, Naomi J. Spence, Daniel E. Adkins, and Tyson H. Brown. 2010. "Pathways to the All-Volunteer Military." *Social Science Quarterly* 91 (2): 455-475.

Fearon James D. and Laitin David D. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review*. 97(1):75-90.

Fershtman, Chaim, and Uri Gneezy. 2001. "Discrimination in a segmented society: An experimental approach." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116(1): 351-377.

Fielding, David, and Anja Shortland. 2010. "'An Eye for an Eye, a Tooth for a Tooth': Political Violence and Counter-insurgency in Egypt." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4): 433-447.

- Forney, Jonathan Filip. 2015. "Who Can We Trust with a Gun? Information Networks and Adverse Selection in Militia Recruitment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(5): 824-849.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004a. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2): 269-292.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004b. *Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*. Princeton University Press.
- Fournier, Anna 2002. "Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 54(3), 415-433.
- Frye, Timothy. 2015. "What Do Voters in Ukraine Want?: A Survey Experiment on Candidate Ethnicity, Language, and Policy Orientation." *Problems of Post-Communism* 62(5): 247-257.
- Giustozzi, Antonio. 2007. "Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan's 'ANA' and the Counter-insurgency Effort, 2002–2006." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18(1): 45-67.
- Gorman, Linda, and George W. Thomas. 1991. "Enlistment Motivations of Army Reservists: Money, Self-Improvement, or Patriotism?." *Armed Forces & Society* 17(4): 589-599.
- Griffith, James. 2008 "Institutional Motives for Serving in the US Army National Guard: Implications for Recruitment, Retention, and Readiness." *Armed Forces & Society* 34(2): 230-258.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970 *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hansen, W. Lee, and Burton A. Weisbrod. 1967. "Economics of the Military Draft." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*: 395-421.
- Harris, Celia B., Helen M. Paterson, and Richard I. Kemp. 2008. "Collaborative Recall and Collective Memory: What Happens When We remember Together?" *Memory* 16 (3): 213-230.

- Horvath, Robert. 2015. "The Euromaidan and the Crisis of Russian Nationalism." *Nationalities Papers* 43(6): 819-839.
- Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2008. "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 436-455.
- Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, and Dustin Tingley. 2010. "A general approach to causal mediation analysis." *Psychological methods* 15(4): 309.
- Jentzsch, Corinna, Stathis N. Kalyvas, and Livia Isabella Schubiger. 2015. "Militias in Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(5): 755-769.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kalyvas, Stathis and Matthew Adam Kocher. 2007. "How "Free" is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem." *World Politics* 59(2): 177-216.
- Karagiannis, Emmanuel. 2016. "Ukrainian Volunteer Fighters in the Eastern Front: Ideas, Political-social Norms and Emotions as Mobilization Mechanisms." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 16(1): 139-153.
- Katchanovski, Ivan. 2016. "The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?." *European Politics and Society* 17(4): 473-489.
- Kleykamp, Meredith A. 2006. "College, Jobs, or the Military? Enlistment During a Time of War." *Social Science Quarterly* 87(2): 272-290.
- Korb, Lawrence J., and Sean E. Duggan. 2007. "An All-volunteer Army? Recruitment and its Problems." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 40(3): 467-471.
- Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Merton G. Henry. 1955. *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*. No. 20. Department of the Army.
- Krueger, Norris, and Peter R. Dickson. 1994. "How Believing in Ourselves Increases Risk Taking: Perceived Self-efficacy and Opportunity Recognition." *Decision Sciences* 25(3): 385-400.

Kulyk, Volodymyr. 2011. "Language Identity, Linguistic Diversity, and Political Cleavages," *Nation and Nationalism*, 17(3): 627-648.

Kuzio, Taras. 2010. "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43(3): 285-296.

Kuzio, Taras. 2015a. "Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 15(1): 157-169.

Kuzio, Taras. 2015b "A New Framework for Understanding Nationalisms in Ukraine: Democratic Revolutions, Separatism and Russian Hybrid War." *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 1 (2015): 30-51.

Laitin, David. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca: New York: Cornell University Press.

Laruelle, Marlene. 2016. "The Three Colors of Novorossiia, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32(1): 55-74.

Lievens, Filip. 2007. "Employer Branding in the Belgian Army: The Importance of Instrumental and Symbolic Beliefs for Potential Applicants, Actual Applicants, and Military Employees." *Human Resource Management* 46(1): 51-69.

Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments" In Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: The Free Press. 1-64.

Lyall, Jason. 2009. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 331-362.

Lyall, Jason, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai. 2013. "Explaining Support for Combatants During Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan." *American Political Science Review* 107(4): 679-705.

MacLean, Alair, and Nicholas L. Parsons. 2010. "Unequal Risk: Combat Occupations in the Volunteer Military." *Sociological Perspectives* 53(3): 347-372.

Maoz, Zeev, and Belgin San-Akca. 2012. "Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946–20011." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(4): 720-734.

McAdam, Doug. 1986. "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer." *American Journal of Sociology* 92(1): 64-90.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McCullough, Michael E., Robert Kurzban, and Benjamin A. Tabak. 2015. "Cognitive Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 36(1): 1-15.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. "Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: the liberal delusions that provoked Putin." *Foreign Affairs* 93: 1-12.

Miller, Richard E., and Austin Sarat. 1980. "Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture." *Law and Society Review* (1): 525-566.

Mitrokhin, Nikolay. 2015. "Infiltration, Instruction, Invasion: Russia's War in the Donbass." *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society* 1(1): 219-250.

Moskos Jr, Charles C. 1977. "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization." *Armed Forces & Society* 4(1): 41-50.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. "Why the Rule of Law Matters." *Journal of Democracy* 15(4): 32-46.

O'Laughlin, John O. 2001. "The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, or Bogus Effect." *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, 42(1): 1-33.

Onuch, Olga. 2014. "Who Were the Protesters?(EuroMaidan)." *Journal of Democracy* 25 (3): 1-8.

Orth, Ulrich, Leo Montada, and Andreas Maercker. 2006. "Feelings of Revenge, Retaliation Motive, and Posttraumatic Stress Reactions in Crime Victims." *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 21(2): 229-243.

- Osipian, Ararat L., and Alexandr L. Osipian. 2006. "Why Donbass Votes for Yanukovich: Confronting the Ukrainian Orange Revolution." *Demokratizatsiya* 14(4): 495-517.
- Parkinson, Sarah Elizabeth. 2013. "Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War." *American Political Science Review* 107(3): 418-432.
- Petersen, Roger D. 2002. *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F., and Linda R. Tropp. 2008. "How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-analytic Tests of Three Mediators." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 38(6): 922-934.
- Pickering, Jeffrey. 2011. "Dangerous Drafts? A Time-Series, Cross-National Analysis of Conscription and the Use of Military Force, 1946–2001." *Armed Forces & Society* 37(1):119-140.
- Posen, Barry R. 1993. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." *Survival* 35(1): 27-47.
- Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002. *Democracies at War*. Princeton University Press.
- Ross, Thomas W. 1994. "Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 37(1): 109-131.
- Safer, Martin A., Linda J. Levine, and Amy L. Drapalski. 2002. "Distortion in Memory for Emotions: The Contributions of Personality and Post-event Knowledge." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 28 (11): 1495-1507.
- Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham. "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups." *International Organization* (2011): 709-744.
- Sambanis, Nicholas, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, and Moses Shayo. 2012. "Parochialism as a Central Challenge in Counterinsurgency." *Science* 336 (6083): 805-808.

- Sander, Thomas H. and Putnam, Robert D. 2010. "Still Bowling Alone? The Post-9/11 Split." *Journal of Democracy* 21(1): 9-16.
- Shafer, D. Michael. 2014. *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency policy*. Princeton University Press.
- Shekhovtsov, Anton, and Andreas Umland. 2014. "Ukraine's Radical Right." *Journal of Democracy* 25(3): 58-63.
- Simmons, Erica. 2014. "Grievances Do Matter in Mobilization." *Theory and Society* 43(5): 513-546.
- Souleimanov, Emil Aslan and Huseyn Aliyev. 2015. "Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars." 40(2): 158-180.
- Staniland, Paul. 2015. "Militias, Ideology, and the State." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(5): 770-793.
- Strachan, Hew, and Chris Bellamy. 2004. *The Oxford Companion to Military History*. Eds. Richard Holmes, and Hugh Bicheno. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor 1998. *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. 2015. *Contentious Politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Tishkov, Valery. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame*. Vol. 15. Sage.
- Toft, Monica Duffy, and Yuri M. Zhukov. 2012. "Denial and Punishment in the North Caucasus Evaluating the effectiveness of Coercive Counter-insurgency." *Journal of Peace Research* 49(6): 785-800.
- Trumbore, Peter F. 1998. "Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process." *International Studies Quarterly* 42(3): 545-565.

Tsang, Jo-Ann. 2002. "Moral Rationalization and the Integration of Situational Factors and Processes in Immoral Behavior." *Review of General Psychology* 6(1):25-50.

Tsygankov, Andrei. 2015. "Vladimir Putin's Last Stand: The Sources of Russia's Ukraine Policy." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 31(4): 279-303.

Walter, Barbara F. 2004. "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 371-388.

Warner, John T., and Beth J. Asch. 2001. "The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 15 (2): 169-192.

Warner, John, Curtis Simon, and Deborah Payne. 2003. "The Military Recruiting Productivity Slowdown: The Roles of Resources, Opportunity Cost and the Tastes of Youth." *Defence and Peace Economics* 14(5): 329-342.

Watson, David, and Lee Anna Clark. 1999. "The PANAS-X: Manual for the positive and negative affect schedule-expanded form." 8-1-1999. University of Iowa.

Wilson, Andrew. 2005. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. Yale University Press.

Wood, Elizabeth J. 2003. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wong, Leonard, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, and Terrence M. Potter. *Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq war*. ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2003.

Zhukov, Yuri M. 2015. "Trading Hard Hats for Combat Helmets: The Economics of Rebellion in Eastern Ukraine." *Journal of Comparative Economics* (forthcoming). Available from:
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014759671500092X>

Appendix Figure 1. Effects of Ethnocentrism on Military Mobilization

